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Abstract 
 
The empirical evidence on the association between board structure and firms’ voluntary 
disclosures is mixed and controversial. We extend the literature by arguing that independent 
directors do not represent a homogeneous group of people, as previously considered. We 
hypothesize that the professional backgrounds of independent directors shape their assessments 
of costs and benefits related to disclosure of information that potentially reduces agency costs 
but also lessens firms’ competitive advantages. Using hand-collected data from a sample of 
biotechnology firms, we find results consistent with this idea. Particularly, firms whose 
independent directors provide links to the wider social community, but lack functional or 
business experience, more frequently disclose proprietary information. We find opposite results 
for the firms whose independent directors possess significant functional expertise. We conclude 
that all independent directors are not equal in their influence on firms’ disclosure policies. Our 
study has several policy implications. 
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Are all independent directors created equal? Do their professional backgrounds influence 
firms’ financial disclosures? Evidence from US biotechnology firms 
 
1. Introduction 
The literature argues that the board of directors and corporate disclosure are two potential 
mechanisms to mitigate agency conflicts between managers and shareholders (Lambert, 2001).1 
Independent directors mitigate managers’ opportunistic actions, reducing managers’ incentives to 
withhold information and, as such, improving the quality of firms’ financial disclosures.2 
However, firms’ voluntary disclosures are not costless, as they impose proprietary costs. 
Specifically, certain disclosures reduce agency costs but also lessen firms’ competitive advantages, 
by revealing sensitive information to firms’ suppliers, competitors, regulators, and employees 
(Dye, 1985).  
A large body of literature, however, finds mixed and often controversial evidence on the 
association between independent directors and corporate disclosures. This literature broadly 
classifies all independent directors into one category and treats them as a homogeneous group of 
people. We argue that the professional backgrounds of independent directors matter in their 
governance roles (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Hillman et al., 2000). Specifically, the 
independent directors’ assessments of costs and benefits of firms’ proprietary disclosures could 
differ depending on their professional backgrounds. We examine this hypothesis in a setting 
characterized by both high agency costs and high proprietary costs, and we find results consistent 
with our hypothesis. Accordingly, we extend the literature by showing that the association between 
governance and disclosure is shaped by independent directors’ professional backgrounds.  
Eng and Mak (2003) and Gul and Leung (2004) find a negative association between the 
proportion of outside directors and the amount of corporate voluntary disclosures. In contrast, 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Leung and Horwitz (2004), Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007), and Li 
1 See Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), and Williamson (1981). 
2 See Fama (1980), Leftwich et al. (1981), Fama and Jensen (1983), and Ajinkya et al. (2005). 
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et al. (2008) find a positive association. These differences could be driven by both the presence of 
proprietary costs and the differences in independent directors’ professional experiences. Our 
motivation comes from Westphal and Milton (2000), who show that professional experience 
affects the directors’ role in setting common objectives for the board of directors and in the novel 
perspectives they offer to company management; Kosnik (1987) and Kaplan and Reishus (1990), 
who find that directors’ wider experience and expertise affect their incentives to monitor 
management; and Hillman et al. (2000), who show that the professional experience of independent 
directors affects firms’ regulatory compliances.   
We hypothesize that the mixed results on the association between independent directors 
and corporate disclosures could reflect the failure to consider the professional backgrounds of these 
directors. Thus, following Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) and Hillman et al. (2000), we classify 
independent directors into business experts (BussExp), support specialists (SuppSpec), and 
community influentials (CommInfl). Business experts are current or past senior officers of other 
companies. They facilitate executive decision making and act as a sounding board for major policy 
decisions. Support specialists (e.g., scientists and lawyers) are experts in functional areas but lack 
business experience at an executive level. And community influentials (e.g., professors and retired 
politicians) exert significant influence over the members of the community and provide links with 
government and regulatory bodies, but they lack general business experience. We hypothesize that 
these three types of independent directors affect firms’ disclosure strategies differently because, 
due to their diverse professional backgrounds, they assess the costs and benefits of firms’ 
proprietary disclosures differently (Kosnik, 1987; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990).  
We examine our research question using hand-collected data on product-related disclosures 
of biotechnology firms. We are guided by Guo, Lev, and Zhou (2004, p. 320), who argue: “The 
unusually fast innovation pace in the biotech sector and the low barriers to entry enhance 
competition and the consequent proprietary costs of disclosure, as well as create large information 
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asymmetries between managers and investors, which increase the benefits of disclosure.” 
Moreover, they argue that biotechnology firms are characterized by a high level of innovation and 
large initial losses, especially if their research and development (R&D) activities are oriented 
toward products in the initial stages of development (“preclinical” products). As such, these firms 
find obtaining debt financing difficult. Thus, they typically fund their losses and research projects 
by equity financing. But equity investors in these firms demand detailed disclosures on the progress 
of the research projects to reduce agency costs as well as to take prompt investment and divestment 
decisions. However, per US GAAP, biotechnology firms cannot credibly disclose the value of 
their in-house investments in intangible assets via the capitalized asset category. Arguably, the 
firms could partly convey this information via their narrative disclosures in annual reports (for 
example, a product’s progress from the preclinical phase to the clinical trial stage). Therefore, their 
narrative disclosures assume paramount importance and are often the only credible source of 
information on firms’ future prospects in financial statements. Yet, these disclosures might impose 
proprietary costs because they could reduce firms’ competitive advantages (Jones, 2007). 
 Consequently, the biotechnology sector provides a unique setting to test the role of 
independent directors and their professional backgrounds on the disclosures that potentially impose 
proprietary costs. We follow Guo et al. (2004) in determining the quality of biotechnology firms’ 
narrative disclosures via a disclosure index. This index measures whether and how firms reveal the 
stage of the development of the product, the diseases that the product potentially treats, and the 
product formula. Guo et al. (2004) find significant differences between disclosures related to 
preclinical and clinical products, representing products under development and developed 
products, respectively.3 Accordingly, Guo et al. (2004) conclude that proprietary costs are one of 
the main forces driving the disclosure policies of R&D–intensive firms. Following, Guo et al. 
3 This product classification is consistent with the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) classification. A 
successful drug goes through three phases of clinical trials (on humans), after the efficacy of the compound is assessed 
in the preclinical stage. The probability of a chemical compound making it through from discovery to final 
commercialization is assessed at about one in five thousand (Healy et al., 2002)  
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(2004), we estimate the overall disclosure index by first separately estimating the disclosure indices 
for preclinical and clinical products and then summing them up. In our first set of tests, we find 
univariate statistics of the disclosure index and its association with product mix to be similar to 
Guo et al. (2004). This supports the validity of our disclosure index. 
Consistent with prior findings, we make no prediction about the association between the 
disclosure index and the proportion of independent directors on firms’ boards. Yet we hypothesize 
that the three types of independent directors (BussExp, SuppSpec, CommInfl) are associated 
differently with the two types of firm disclosures (those that do and do not impose a proprietary 
cost). That is, compared with firms with community influentials (those who lack business 
experience), firms with support specialists (who potentially understand the damage that the 
disclosures of proprietary information can cause) are more cautious in disclosing information on 
preclinical products. Thus, we expect no significant differences between the two types of 
independent directors’ influence on disclosures related to clinical products (their disclosures 
impose less competitive costs). However, we expect significant difference between the two types 
of independent directors’ influence on disclosures related to preclinical products (which impose 
significant competitive costs). This is the main thesis of our study. 
Consistent with the literature, we find no significant association between the overall 
disclosures and the proportion of independent directors on the board. Further, we find no 
significant association between the disclosures of clinical products and the three types of 
independent directors. However, firms with community influentials disclose significantly more 
information about preclinical products than the other firms. In contrast, firms with support 
specialists disclose significantly less information about preclinical products than the other firms. 
Our results are consistent with the idea that firms with support specialists are more cautious with 
respect to proprietary disclosures. Our results also support the idea that community influentials 
assess the costs and benefits of proprietary disclosures differently than the other independent 
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directors. We find similar results by bifurcating disclosures into those related to technology versus 
market aspects of the products. Thus, we conclude that the professional backgrounds of 
independent directors matter when it comes to disclosures of firms’ proprietary information. This 
is our main conclusion and contribution to the literature.4 
We hesitate to assign causation because our results are consistent with at least two 
explanations. First, the professional backgrounds of independent directors’ influence their 
assessments of costs and benefits of firms’ proprietary disclosures. These directors thus shape their 
firms’ disclosure policies accordingly. Second, firms select their governance structure according 
to their corporate and disclosure policies. Arguably, firms with higher (lower) proprietary costs of 
disclosures choose a higher proportion of support specialists (community influentials). Our tests 
cannot completely distinguish between these two explanations. However, we find no association 
between board structure and firms’ product mix, which is inconsistent with the second explanation. 
Therefore, we lean toward the first explanation in our exposition, based on the argument that the 
principal role of board of directors is to reduce agency conflicts between management and 
shareholders and that independent directors influence firms’ disclosure decisions (Fama, 1980; 
Leftwich et al., 1981; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Ajinkya et al., 2005).  
We contribute to the literature on governance and disclosure by showing that the 
professional backgrounds of independent directors is a significant factor in firms’ proprietary 
disclosures (e.g., Forker, 1992; Hossain et al., 1995; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Hannifa and Cooke, 
2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 2004; Ajinkya et al., 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 
2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Lim et al., 2007). Our study 
has at least two policy implications. It suggests that organizations representing minority 
shareholder interests and seeking to promote corporate governance, such as the California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), must 
4 However, we find no significant association between business experts and proprietary disclosures. 
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consider the professional backgrounds of independent directors in their shaping of investee firms’ 
governance structures. Our study also suggests that regulatory bodies [such as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC)] might demand the reporting of independent directors in different 
classifications based on their professional backgrounds. In addition, our findings indicate that any 
future study examining the effects of independent directors must explicitly consider the differences 
between their professional backgrounds. Otherwise, erroneous conclusions could be reached. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the literature on 
corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Section 3 describes sample selection and 
measurement of variables. Section 4 reports the results of the study, and Section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature review and motivation of hypothesis   
The literature considers both governance and financial disclosures as mechanisms to 
reduce agency costs. Moreover, the literature shows that the professional background of an 
independent director influences her ability and incentives to monitor managers. In addition, the 
literature suggests that voluntary disclosures are related to the governance structure and the 
managers’ assessments of trade-offs between the costs and benefits of making these disclosures 
voluntarily.  
2.1. Voluntary disclosures 
The literature identifies conditions under which firms voluntarily disclose all of their 
private information (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; Milgrom and 
Roberts 1986). This “unraveling result” predicts that investors would rationally infer that if 
managers do not disclose any information, then that information would have caused investors to 
revise their beliefs about firm value downward. Consistent with this prediction, theoretical and 
empirical studies show that voluntary disclosures reduce firms’ cost of capital (Barry and Brown, 
1985; Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Hughes et al., 2007), improve 
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firm valuation and stock liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; 
Healy et al., 1999), and increase shareholders’ wealth.  
The first condition used to derive the unraveling result is that all disclosures be costless. 
Some disclosures, however, impose proprietary costs (Dye, 1985, 1986; Darrough and 
Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990; Prencipe, 2004; Skinner, 1994; Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000). For example, disclosures reduce firms’ competitive advantage by providing proprietary 
information to other players in product markets, labor unions, and regulators. Thus some 
disclosures impose both costs and benefits. Hence, despite investors’ viewing nondisclosures as 
bad news, managers might not disclose news if they can achieve higher payoffs by avoiding the 
costs associated with its disclosure. In that case, managers disclose proprietary information only 
when they assess the benefits of disclosures as higher than their proprietary costs (Verrecchia, 
1983). For example, Clarkson et al. (1994) find that firms’ disclosures are associated with their 
product market competition. 
2.2. Governance and voluntary disclosures: complements or substitutes 
Williamson (1984) develops a theoretical framework to relate disclosure quality to 
corporate governance. Numerous studies use this framework to examine the impact of 
governance mechanisms on voluntary disclosures (Gul and Leung, 2004; Ho and Wong, 2001; 
Eng and Mak, 2003; Li et al., 2008). Findings from these studies indicate that the relationship 
between governance and disclosure could be either complementary or substitutive.  
 
2.2.1. Complementary relationship 
One stream of literature argues that governance strengthens internal control, providing 
an “intensive monitoring package” that constrains managers’ opportunistic behavior (Leftwich 
et al., 1981). In such an intensive monitoring environment, managers withhold less information 
for their personal benefits, and disclose more information on firms’ underlying performance. 
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Consistent with this complementary-relation hypothesis, empirical studies find a positive 
relationship between the proportion of outside directors and the amount of corporate voluntary 
disclosures (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Leung and Horwitz, 2004; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 
2007; Li et al., 2008). 
2.2.2. Substitutive relationship 
 Another stream of literature argues that firms substitute better corporate governance with 
voluntary disclosures (Rediker and Seth, 1995). The presence of independent directors implies a 
close monitoring of managers that reduces the need for costly disclosures. This argument predicts 
that board governance is negatively associated with external disclosures. Consistent with the 
substitutive relationship, several studies find a negative association between the proportion of 
outside directors and the amount of corporate voluntary disclosures (Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul 
and Leung, 2004).  
 In summary, the empirical evidence on the association between board structure and 
voluntary disclosures is mixed and, often, controversial. Such inconsistent findings might reflect 
a variety of factors, such as differences in institutional settings (European Union, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and US), socioeconomic and political differences between countries (Ahmed and 
Courtis, 1999), investor rights and legal enforcements (La Porta et al., 1998; Leuz et al., 2003), 
and proxies of corporate governance and voluntary disclosures (Dalton et al., 1999; Ahmed and 
Courtis, 1999). 
 
2.3. Professional backgrounds of independent directors 
The literature shows that the professional backgrounds of independent director influence 
their monitoring of company managers and the roles they play in firms’ strategic decisions. For 
example, Mallin and Michelon (2011) show that community influentials are positively associated 
with corporate social performance. Baysinger and Zardkoohi (1986) find that the boards of 
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regulated utilities have a lower proportion of directors performing the monitoring role and a higher 
proportion of directors engaging in public relations. This is because the latter set promotes the 
social image of firms among regulators, legislators, and other external constituencies. Markarian 
and Parbonetti (2007) examine board of director composition by dividing firms into externally and 
internally complex firms. They find that each director plays a specific role consistent with her own 
skills, competencies, and professional expertise. They show that externally complex firms 
substitute community influentials for business experts, but internally complex firms opt for more 
support specialists. They conclude that support specialists guide managers in acquiring appropriate 
industry resources and in improving firms’ internal processes. Markarian and Parbonetti (2007, p. 
2025) summarize that the professional backgrounds of independent directors produce “a mosaic 
of decision making structures and subsequent firm behavior.” 
2.3. Motivation of hypothesis 
The cited literature, mainly from the management and economics fields, clearly shows that 
the professional backgrounds of independent directors influence their monitoring ability and their 
role in setting firms’ strategic priorities. More important, the findings of this literature suggest that 
the influences of independent directors on firms’ voluntary disclosures are likely to differ based 
on their professional backgrounds. However, the finance and accounting literature largely 
examines the association between independent directors and firm disclosures by considering all 
independent directors as one homogeneous category. We fill the gap in the literature by 
hypothesizing that the different skills, experiences, competencies, and professional expertise of the 
independent directors (professional backgrounds) would lead to different assessments of cost-
benefit trade-offs of proprietary disclosures (Kosnik 1987; Kaplan and Reishus 1990).  These 
differences must manifest in differences in firms’ proprietary disclosures to the extent that 
independent directors influence the disclosure policies of their firms. To test this hypothesis, we 
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classify all independent directors into business experts, support specialists, and community 
influentials, consistent with Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990).  
We expect that relative to community influentials, who lack functional business expertise, 
support specialists make superior assessments of the costs of, and are more cautious about, the 
disclosure of information that potentially reduces firms’ competitive advantages. We test this idea 
by using the context of biotechnology firms consistent with Guo et al. (2004). We examine the 
association between the proportion of business experts, support specialists, and community 
influentials and the disclosures related to early stage products of biotechnology firms. 
Based on the above discussion, we hypothesize: 
H1: The proportion of business experts, support specialists, and community influentials is 
associated differently with the proprietary disclosures of biotechnology firms. 
3. Sample selection and measurement of variables  
  In this section, we describe the selection of sample firms from the biotechnology sector and 
the measurement of key variables. 
3.1. Sample selection  
 Our sample contains all active biotechnology firms listed on the US stock exchanges 
without interruption from 2005 to 2009. We identify biotechnology firms by standard industrial 
classification (SIC) code 2836. Firms that cease to exist during the period or have missing data 
are excluded. We restrict our sample to firms that have products under development (other than 
products involving gene therapy, medical devices, and research services). We keep in the sample 
firms that discontinue drug development for a few years due to the failure of clinical trials (for 
example, Prana Biotech and PDL Biopharma), provided they have product development in the 
other years. In these cases, we retain only the firm-year observations in which firms conduct 
development activities. This results in a varying sample size across the study period, consisting 
of 410 firm-years observations, as described in Table 1.  
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[Insert Table 1 near here] 
 
3.2. Measurement of variables  
  We employ a unique set of dependent and independent variables guided by prior 
literature. 
3.2.1. Independent variable: the typology of independent directors 
  We hand-collect data on board composition from SEC DEF 14A proxy filings. First we 
calculate the proportion of independent directors on the board (Independent). We then calculate 
the proportions of these directors following the typology developed by Hillman et al. (2000) and 
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990). That is, we calculate the proportion of business experts 
(BussExp), support specialists (SuppSpec), and community influentials (CommInfl) in firms’ 
boards, using the procedure described in Appendix A.  
3.2.2. Dependent variable: narrative disclosures  
 The development of a new biotechnology product (drug) is a complex process, as 
described in Appendix B. The first stage of product development involves the discovery and 
initial assessments of a chemical compound (the preclinical stage). The compound that passes 
the assessment tests undergoes three phases of clinical trials. The probability of the chemical 
compound making it through from discovery to final commercialization is assessed at about one 
in five thousand (Healy et al., 2002). Given the low rate of success, most biotechnology 
companies have multiple products under development, largely in preclinical phases. We read 
firms’ Form 10-Ks and hand-collect data from their narrative disclosures. We build two 
disclosure indices using a procedure consistent with Guo et al. (2004): the preclinical index and 
the clinical index.5   
5 One of authors initially performed all the coding activity. To ensure reliability and validity of the disclosure score 
over time, another author recoded the data two months later. This generated a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.96 
(Krippendorf, 1980), indicating internal consistency of the coding procedure. 
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 We first construct a disclosure score for each product in five categories.  
(1) Product specifications—information on product properties, effectiveness of the 
product under development, and a comparison of the product with other firms’ products.  
(2) Target disease—information on the intended use of the product, that is, the disease 
for which the product is designed.  
(3) Clinical trials—information on the success of the product in all clinical trials: the 
number of patients, patients’ medical information, doses applied, methods of application, 
and treatment schedules.  
(4) Future development plans—the firm’s future plans for clinical trials, such as expected 
dates, number of participating patients, and duration and method of future clinical trials.  
(5) Market information—the product’s market potential, including the number of patients 
infected by the target disease, the number of cases occurring each year, and the potential 
dollar volume of the market.  
A product can obtain a maximum score of 22 points if it is in the preclinical phase of 
development and 30 points if it is in the clinical phase. To ensure the cross-section comparability 
of the product scores, we divide the scores of the preclinical products by 22 and the scores of the 
clinical products by 30. Appendix C provides the components of the disclosure index and the 
scoring details in constructing the product disclosure index.  
We calculate the overall disclosure index as follows. Consider a company that has five 
products under development of which three are in the preclinical phase and two are in the clinical 
phase. We calculate the average of product disclosure indices of the three products under the 
preclinical phases and call it the preclinical disclosure index. Similarly, we calculate the average 
of the two products under the clinical stages of development and call it the clinical disclosure 
index. Then we add the two disclosure indices (related to clinical and preclinical products) to 
obtain the firm overall disclosure index (Discl_Index). In addition, we build two additional 
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disclosure indices. The first relates to voluntary disclosures of product specifications, target 
disease, and clinical trials (Tech-Discl-Index), and the second relates to information about future 
plans and market disclosures (Market-Discl-Index). Arguably, the latter index is more forward-
looking than the former because it pertains to future plans while the other looks to past 
developments. 
3.2.3. Control variables  
 Previous studies have identified a list of corporate characteristics that affect voluntary 
disclosures, such as corporate size, profitability, and leverage (Marston and Shrives, 1991; 
Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). Large firms benefit from scale effects when collecting and 
disseminating information, so they are likely to provide more information. We measure firm size 
as the natural logarithm of total assets. Agency theory predicts debt as a potential tool for 
mitigating agency conflict between managers and shareholders through additional monitoring. 
As a consequence, high-debt firms can decrease monitoring costs by disclosing more 
information, although our sample firms rarely obtain debt financing. We measure leverage by 
the ratio of a firm’s total liabilities to total assets. Profitability is positively associated with 
voluntary disclosures (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). We define profitability by the ratio of 
earnings before interest and tax to the book value of total assets employed. In addition, we control 
for board size (i.e., the number of directors) and the type of board leadership [whether the chief 
executive officer (CEO) holds the position of chairman]. Finally, we use year dummies to control 
for year fixed effects. 
4. Empirical tests  
 We first discuss the descriptive statistics of our key dependent and independent variables 
and their correlations. We then discuss the tests of the hypothesis.  
4.1. Descriptive statistics  
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 Panel A of Table 2 reports the total number of products examined in this study. Panel B 
presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used. The average 
disclosure index is 0.30, similar to 0.33 reported by Guo et al. (2004). The mean technical 
disclosure index (Tech-Discl-Index) is 0.22, and the mean market disclosure index (Market-
Discl-Index) is 0.08. Nonexecutive directors (Independent) constitute on average 70% of the 
board. The proportion of business experts, support specialists, and community influentials are 
0.33, 0.23, and 0.14, respectively. The average board size is 7.87, similar to the average number 
of directors on boards of 8.0 reported by Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007). Approximately 42% of 
the sample firms have a CEO who is also the chairman of the board. 
[Insert Table 2 near here] 
4.2. Correlational tests 
Table 3 reports the bivariate correlations among the dependent and independent variables. 
Clinical products (Patents) are positively correlated with the overall disclosure score (Discl-
Index), the technical disclosures (Tech-Discl-Index), and the market disclosures (Market-Discl-
Index). All disclosure indices are negatively correlated with the proportion of products under 
early stages of development (Preclinical). These results are consistent with Guo et al. (2004). 
Moreover, the independent directors bear no significant correlation with any of the disclosure 
indices (Discl-Index, Tech-Discl-Index, and Market-Discl-Index). This is consistent with the 
literature. Notably, neither Patent nor Preclinical is significantly associated with independent 
directors or type of independent director. This result is inconsistent with the idea that firms self-
select their board composition based on the stages of product development, reducing the 
endogeneity concern commonly applicable to studies examining an association between 
governance structure and firms’ business decisions. 
[Insert Table 3 near here] 
4.3. Multivariate analysis  
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 We estimate the following regression to examine the association between a firm’s product 
portfolio and its voluntary disclosures. 
 Discl-Index i,t= β1 + β2 × Patentsi t + β3 × Preclinicali,t  
  +Σβs × Controlsi,t   + εi,t ,        (1) 
where i identifies the company and t identifies the year. 
The disclosure decisions are not independent across periods for the same firm. Therefore, 
we estimate standard errors clustered by firms. Column 1 of Table 4 shows that the developed 
products (Patents) are positively associated with the disclosure index (regression coefficient of 
0.134, significant at p-value <0.01), but the products under development (Preclinical) are 
negatively associated with the disclosure index (regression coefficient of −0.126, significant at 
p-value <0.01). Firms thus exercise caution when providing information on early stage products, 
arguably to reduce proprietary costs. This is the main finding of Guo et al. (2004).  
[Insert Table 4 near here] 
We then estimate the regression 
 Discl-Index i,t= β1 + β2 × Patentsi t + β3 × Preclinicali,t + β4 × Independenti,t   
 +Σβs × Controlsi,t   + εi,t.        (2) 
Eq. (2) differs from Eq. (1) because the proportion of independent directors (Independent) 
is included. Column 2 of Table 4 shows no association between the overall disclosures and the 
proportion of independent directors on the board. These results are consistent with the mixed 
results discussed in Subsection 2.2.  
The next regression is  
 Discl-Index i,t= β1 + β2 × Patentsi t + β3 × Preclinicali,t + β4 × Independenti,t   
 + β5 × Preclinicali,t × Independenti,t   
 +Σβs × Controlsi,t   + εi,t.        (3) 
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Eq. (3) differs from Eq. (2) because of the inclusion of interaction of Independent with 
Preclinical.  Column 3 of Table 4 shows that the coefficient on the interaction term (β5) is not 
significant. This result is consistent with the idea that, when summed up across companies, the 
association between independent directors and proprietary disclosures is insignificant.  
We next incorporate the professional backgrounds of the independent directors by 
estimating the regression 
 Discl-Index i,t= β1 + β2 × Patentsi t + β3 × Preclinicali,t + β4 × Independenti,t   
 + β5 × Preclinicali,t × Independenti,t   
 + β6 × DirectorTypei,t  + β7 × Preclinicali,t × DirectorTypei,t  
 +Σβs × Controlsi,t   + εi,t.        (4) 
Eq. (4) differs from Eq. (3) because of the inclusion of the main effects of one type of 
independent directors as well as its interaction with Preclinical. The main effect (DirectorType) 
captures the difference in the overall disclosures due to the inclusion of that type of director 
relative to the average effects of the other two types of independent directors. Similarly, the 
interaction term (Preclinical × DirectorType) captures the difference in the preclinical 
disclosures (relative to clinical disclosures) due to that type of independent director relative to 
the average effects of the other two types of independent directors. Columns 4–6 of Table 4 show 
that the main effects of business experts, support specialists, and community influentials (β6) are 
not significant. However, the interaction terms (β7) are insignificant, significantly negative 
(regression coefficient of −0.318, significant at p-value <0.01), and significantly positive 
(regression coefficient of 0.176, significant at p-value <0.01) for the three types of directors, 
respectively. These results are consistent with the idea that, relative to other independent 
directors, support specialists are better able to distinguish between the proprietary and the 
nonproprietary information or are better able to assess the costs associated with proprietary 
16 
 
disclosures. To the extent that independent directors can influence firms’ disclosure policies, 
results suggest that directors with functional expertise shift firms’ disclosures policies toward 
caution. In contrast, the directors who improve a firm’s image in the wider community but lack 
business experience shift firms’ policies toward greater disclosures even when such disclosures 
impose proprietary costs. This is the main finding of this study. 
4.4. Robustness tests 
  We conduct two robustness tests. We estimate the detailed regression 
 Discl-Index i,t= β1 + β2 × Patentsi t + β3 × Preclinicali,t  
  + β4 × BussExpi,t  + β5 × Preclinicali,t × BussExp i,t  
  + β6 × SuppSpeci,t  + β7 × Preclinicali,t × SuppSpeci,t 
  + β8 × CommInfli,t  + β9 × Preclinicali,t × CommInfli,t 
  +Σβs × Controlsi,t   + εi,t .        (5) 
In unreported tests, the coefficient on the second interaction term (Preclinical × 
SuppSpec) is negative and significant, and the coefficient on the third interaction term 
(Preclinical × CommInfl) is positive and significant. These results are consistent with Eq. (4). 
We conduct additional tests by dividing overall disclosures into those related to product 
specifications, target disease, and clinical trials (Tech-Discl-Index) and those related to 
information on future plans and market disclosures (Market-Discl-Index). Market disclosures 
contain information related to future development plans as well as the size of the drug’s market. 
Technical disclosures pertain to product specifications, target disease, and clinical aspects. 
Firms’ costs and benefits of, and independent directors’ influence on, the two types of disclosures 
could differ. However, Panels A and B of Table 5 show that our results hold for both types of 
disclosures and are consistent with our main results. 
[Insert Table 5 near here] 
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5. Conclusions 
 The paper examines whether the professional backgrounds of the independent directors 
is associated with financial disclosures that potentially reduce agency costs but lessen firms’ 
competitive advantages. The biotechnology sector represents a unique setting to examine these 
proprietary disclosures because the disclosures on early stage products can reveal valuable 
information to firms’ employees, regulators, and competitors. We find that firms with 
independent directors possessing functional business expertise are relatively cautious in 
disclosing information on early stage products. In contrast, firms with independent directors who 
provide linkages to the wider community but lack business experience are more forthcoming on 
proprietary disclosures. These results are consistent with the idea that independent directors with 
dissimilar professional backgrounds evaluate the costs and benefits of proprietary disclosures 
differently and influence firms’ disclosure policies accordingly.  
Our findings clearly suggest that independent directors are not homogeneous in their 
ability to monitor and influence firms’ financial disclosures. Thus, our conclusions lead to 
several policy implications. First, the professional backgrounds of independent directors must 
be considered in formulation of firms’ governance structures, and these governance structures 
must be related to the extent to which firms derive competitive advantages from their proprietary 
information. Thus, organizations such as CalPERS and ISS that aim to promote corporate 
governance must consider the professional backgrounds of independent directors in shaping their 
investee firms’ governance structures. Second, regulators could demand the reporting of details 
of the independent directors in categories that reflect their professional backgrounds. Based on 
our findings, we propose that any study examining the association between firms’ corporate 
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governance and disclosure policies must explicitly consider the professional backgrounds of the 
independent directors. 
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APPENDIX A 
Classification of independent directors 
 
Business experts (BussExp) are managers, or former managers, of other companies, possessing specialized 
business knowledge. They are involved in strategic decision making. They are often experts in the identification of 
new geographic segments, new product markets, and synergistic merger targets, and they understand customer needs 
and are able to assess business opportunities.  They can help the firms in identifying new product markets, which is 
fundamental to increasing market share and successfully marketing the potential products.   
 
Support specialists (SuppSpec) possess specialized knowledge in a specific industrial area. They often lack 
formal business training and knowledge but are usually specialists in the specific industrial sector in which they 
operate. They advise managers and help them acquire resources and knowledge for improving the internal processes 
of the firm. They also provide valuable links with other industry organizations. 
  
Community influentials (CommInfl) are retired politicians, are affiliated with the armed forces, belong to 
nonbusiness organizations, or are drawn from the local community. 
 
 Following are three examples of board member biographies, one for each classification of independent 
directors. 
 
1. Gordon Binder (Acadia Pharmaceuticals): Has served as a director of our company since June 2003. Mr. 
Binder is the founder and managing director of Coastview Capital. Mr. Binder was the chief executive officer 
of Amgen, the world’s largest biotechnology company, from 1988 through 2000. During his tenure as chief 
executive officer, Amgen grew from four hundred employees to rank within the top 20 pharmaceutical 
companies in worldwide revenues, the top 15 in United States sales, and the top ten in market capitalization. 
Mr. Binder serves on the boards of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the California Institute of 
Technology, and the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. (BussExp) 
 
2. Alan B. Glassberg (Biogen Idec): Dr. Glassberg is a Venture Partner and member of the Scientific Advisory 
Board of Bay City Capital, a firm which manages investment funds in the life sciences industry. Dr. Glassberg 
has been associated with Bay City Capital since August 2006. Dr. Glassberg served as Chief Medical Officer 
of Poniard Pharmaceuticals, Inc. from August 2006 to March 2007, and currently serves as a consultant to 
Poniard and as a member of its Clinical Advisory Board. Dr. Glassberg retired from the University of 
California San Francisco in June, 2006, where he served as Associate Director of Clinical Care and Director 
of General Oncology at the University of California San Francisco Comprehensive Cancer Center. 
(SuppSpec) 
 
 
3. Joseph L. Bower (Anika Therapeutics): Dr. Bower joined the Board of Directors of Anika Therapeutics in 
February 1993 and has served as Lead Director since April 2005. He has held various positions at the Harvard 
Business School since 1963, where he was named Professor of Business Administration in 1972 and Donald 
Kirk David Professor of Business Administration in 1986. He has served as Chairman of the Doctoral 
Programs, Director of Research, Senior Associate Dean for External Relations, Chair of the General 
Management Area and is currently Chair of the General Manager Program. Dr. Bower received an A.B. from 
Harvard University and an M.B.A. and a D.B.A. from the Harvard Business School. He is a director of Brown 
Shoe Company, Inc., New America High Income Fund, Sonesta International Hotels Corporation, Loews 
Corporation and TH Lee Putnam EOP. (CommInfl) 
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APPENDIX B 
Stages in the development of a new biotechnology product (drug) 
Drug development refers to a series of processes that are followed before a drug is brought to market. It is 
complex, expensive, and spread over ten to 12 years (Babiarz, 2008).  The Food and Drug Administration establishes 
the guidelines for drug development. Based on these guidelines, the processes can be divided into two phases: 
preclinical and clinical.  
 
In the preclinical phase, after a chemical compound is discovered that can potentially treat a disease, its 
chemical makeup, stability, and solubility are assessed. Before testing the compound on humans, its safety, toxicity, 
pharmacokinetics, and metabolism also are considered. Furthermore, an assessment is made for the dosage and 
schedule of its administration. Tests are conducted using in vitro methods (e.g., with isolated cells) or with laboratory 
animals. The company submits to the FDA the results of the preclinical testing and the proposed plan for clinical 
testing. If the FDA approves the plan, then the company files an investigational new drug application (IND) for human 
testing.  
 
In the clinical phase, testing has three phases. In Phase I, the drug is tested on 20 to 80 healthy volunteers to assess 
its side effects and how the drug is metabolized and excreted. In Phase II, the drug is tested on 50 to 300 patients to 
assess the effectiveness and its short-term side effects. In Phase III, the safety and effectiveness of the drug is assessed 
on up to 3,000 patients using different dosages and in combination with other drugs. Thereafter, the company submits 
the test results as well as the proposed manufacturing process to the FDA to seek approval for marketing the new drug.   
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APPENDIX C 
Product disclosure index 
The disclosure index is constructed for each biotechnology product by hand-collecting relevant information 
from annual report (Business section of Form 10-K). Information is derived for the following five categories: 
product specifications, target disease, clinical trials, future development plans, and market information. The 
procedure for assigning scores in each category is tabulated (with a detailed example) in Appendix C.2. 
 
C.1. Measurement of product disclosure index 
I. Product Specifications 
1.  How does the product work? (3 points = three sentences; 2 = two sentences; 1 = one sentence; 0 = none) 
2a. Why is it better than previous products? (2 = name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 0 = no discussion) 
2b. Why is it better than competing products? (2 = name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 0 = no 
discussion) 
3. What is the chemical/biological structure? (2 = chemical compound; 1 = general discussion; 0 = not 
mentioned) 
Subtotal I = total scores of (1 + max(2a, 2b) + 3) 
 
II. Target disease 
1. What kind of diseases does the product treat? (2 = disease name mentioned; 1 = disease name not mentioned; 
0 = no discussion) 
2. What are other possible uses of the drug? (2 = disease name mentioned; 1 = disease name not mentioned; 0 = 
no discussion) 
Subtotal II = total scores of (1 + 2) 
 
III. Clinical trials 
1. Number of patients (1 = given; 0 = absent) 
2. Patients information (with what diseases) (1 = given; 0 = absent) 
3. Doses (amounts) used in the clinical trial (1 = given; 0 = absent) 
4. Method used in the clinical trial (1 = given; 0 = absent) 
5. Treatment schedule (duration or frequency) (1 = given; 0 = absent) 
6. Trial results [detailed = pro and cons + numbers (3); general = numbers (2); brief = no numbers (1); none 
(0)] 
Subtotal III = total scores of (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6) 
 
IV. Future plans 
1a. Is there any plan to try the product on new diseases? (2 = disease name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 
0 = no discussion) 
1b. Is there any plan to try the product with other products? (2 = name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 0 = 
not mentioned) 
2. Future plan for clinical trials 
2a. Planned date (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
2b. Number of patients for the planned trial (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
2c. Patient information for the planned trial (what disease) (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
2d. Duration (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
2e. Method (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
3. Possible alliance (2 = name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
Subtotal IV = total scores of (max(1a, 1b) + 2a + 2b + 2c + 2d + 2e + 3) 
 
V. Market information 
1. Number of patients affected by the disease (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
2. Number of incidents (market size) (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
Subtotal V = total scores of scores (1 + 2) 
Overall disclosure score = sum of Subtotals I–Scaled disclosure score = overall disclosure score divided by 30 
for products either in or beyond the clinical trials phase; by 22 for the products that did not reach clinical trials 
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 APPENDIX C continued 
Product disclosure index 
C.2. An example of the measurement of product disclosure index 
Company MAXYGEN  
Product MAXY-G34 
Development stage Phase II 
    
Disclosure index (information is drawn from the 
Business section, Part I, of Form 10-K) Score contents 
I. Product specifications    
1. How does the product work? (3 = three 
sentences; 2 = two sentences; 1= one sentence; 0 
= none) 1. Helps the body make blood cells. 
2a. Why is it better than previous products? (2 = 
name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 0 = 
not mentioned) 
2. MAXY-G34 reduces the duration of neutropenia when 
compared with the currently marketed products (Neulasta 
and Neupogen). 
2b. Why is it better than competing products? (2 
= name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 0 = 
not mentioned) 
2. MAXY-G34 protects patients from chemotherapy and 
radiation therapy–related infections, shortens the duration 
of hospital stays, and helps keep patients on schedule for 
their cancer treatments.  
3. What is the chemical structure in addition to 
its chemical name? (2= name mentioned; 0 = not 
mentioned)  0. Not mentioned. 
Subtotal I = total scores of (1 + max (2a, 2b) + 
3) 3, out of a maximum of 7. 
II. Target diseases    
1. What kind of diseases does the product treat? 
(2 = disease name mentioned; 1 = disease name 
not mentioned; 0 = not mentioned)  2. Neutropenia. 
2. What are the other possible uses? (2 = disease 
name mentioned; 1 = disease name not 
mentioned; 0 = not mentioned)  0. Not mentioned. 
Subtotal II = total scores of (1 + 2)  2, out of a maximum of 4. 
 
III. Clinical trials    
1. Number of patients (1= mentioned; 0 = not 
mentioned)  1. 47  
2. Patients information (with what disease) (1 = 
name mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 
1. Patients with breast cancer who have failed at least one 
potentially curative treatment regimen. 
3. Doses (amounts) used in the clinical trial (1 = 
mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 1. 5 to 100 µg/kg was given. 
4. Method (via what kind of media) used in the 
clinical trial (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 1. Subcutaneous injection. 
5. Treatment schedule (duration or frequency) (1 
= given; 0 = absent) 
1. Single dose MAXY-G34 therapy being administered 
per three-week chemotherapy cycle with each patient 
receiving six cycles of docetaxel. 
6. Results (3 = detailed discussion; 2 = general 
discussion; 1 = brief discussion; 0 = no 
discussion)  
2. The results of the Phase I clinical trial indicate that the 
drug MAXY-G34 was generally safe and well tolerated 
through the study.  
Subtotal III = total scores of (1 + 2+ 3 + 4 + 5 
+ 6)  7, out of a maximum of 8. 
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APPENDIX C continued 
Product disclosure index 
C.2. An example of the measurement of product disclosure index 
IV. Future development plans   
1a. Is there any plan to try the product on new diseases? 
(2 = name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 0 = not 
mentioned) 2. Hemophilia.  
1b. Is there any plan to try the product with other 
products? (2 = name mentioned; 1 = no name mentioned; 
0 = not mentioned) 0.  Not mentioned.  
2. Future plan for clinical trials    
2a. Planned date (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 1. 2008. 
2b. Number of patients for the planned trial (what 
disease) (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned)  0. Not mentioned. 
2c. Patient information for the planned trial (what 
disease) (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 1. Breast cancer patients.  
2d. Duration (1= mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 0. Not mentioned. 
2e. Method (1 = mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 0. Not mentioned. 
3. Alliance (2 = name mentioned; 1 = no name 
mentioned; 0 = not mentioned)  2. We entered into a strategic alliance with Roche. 
Subtotal IV = total scores of [max (1a, 1b) + 2a + 2b + 
2c + 2d + 2e + 3) 6, out of a maximum of 9. 
V. Market information    
1. Number of patients affected by the disease (1 = 
mentioned; 0 = not mentioned) 0.  Not mentioned. 
2. Number of incidents (market size) (1 = mentioned; 0 = 
not mentioned) 0.  Not mentioned. 
Subtotal V = total scores of (1 + 2) 0, out of a maximum of 2. 
Overall disclosure score = sum of Subtotals I–V 18, out of a maximum of 30.  
Scaled disclosure score = overall disclosure score 
divided by 30 because MAXY-G34 is in clinical trials 
phase 0.60, out of a maximum of 1.00. 
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APPENDIX D 
 Definitions of variables  
 
Variable description Variable name Definition 
Disclosure index Discl-Index Overall disclosure index as defined in Appendix C.   
Disclosure index for 
technical information 
Tech-Discl-Index Calculated as the sum of product specifications disclosure index, 
target disease disclosure index, and clinical trial disclosure index. 
Disclosure index for 
market formation 
Market-Discl-Index Calculated as the sum of future plan and market information 
disclosure index. 
Patents Patents Proportion of patented products to total number of products.  
Preclinical Preclinical Proportion of products under screening, development, application, 
and preclinical phase to total number of products. 
Independent directors Independent Proportion of independent directors on board of directors. 
Business experts BussExp Proportion of business experts on board of directors. 
Support specialists SuppSpec Proportion of support specialists on board of directors. 
Community 
influentials 
CommInfl Proportion of community influentials on board of directors. 
CEO duality ChairCEO  Dummy variable equal to one if CEO is also the chairman of the 
board and zero otherwise. 
Number of board 
members 
BoardSize Total number of directors. 
Profitability ROA Ratio of earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) to the book 
value of total assets employed. 
Leverage Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
Firm size FirmSize Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Year dummies Year Dummies Four dummy variables that take a value of one if fiscal years equal 
2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 1 
Sample selection 
The table reports the total number of annual reports analyzed (firm-years). Initial firms are biotechnology 
firms (standard industrial classification code 2836) with valid data in Compustat. Firms are dropped due to mergers 
and acquisitions and for other reasons. 
Fiscal year  
Number of initial 
firms  Firms dropped  Final sample 
2005  100  23  77 
2006  96  16  80 
2007  111  26  85 
2008  112  28  84 
2009  106  22  84 
   Total  525  115   410 
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics  
 Variables are defined in Appendix D. IND = investigational new drug; FDA = US Food and Drug   
 
Panel A:  Descriptive statistics of products for sample firms in the study years   
Stage  Substage Stage score Number of product  
Initial screening Screening 1 51 
 Development 2 15 
Preclinical testing Preclinical testing 3 617 
 IND application 4 34 
Clinical testing Phase I clinical trials 5 739 
 Phase II clinical trials  7 780 
 Phase III clinical trials 10 354 
FDA review 
 
NDA application 12 255 
Total 2,845 
 
Panel B:  Descriptive statistics for sample firms in the study years   
Variable Mean  
Standard 
deviation  Q1  Median  Q3 
Discl-Index 0.30  0.11  0.22  0.28  0.37 
Tech-Discl-Index 0.22  0.08  0.15  0.19  0.25 
Market-Discl-Index 0.08  0.05  0.05  0.08  0.10 
Patents 0.74  0.29  0.50  0.83  1.00 
Preclinical 0.29  0.29  0.00  0.25  0.50 
Independent 70%  19%  57%  71%  83% 
BussExp 33%  18%  20%  33%  45% 
SuppSpec 23%  15%  12%  25%  33% 
CommInfl 14%  14%  0%  12%  20% 
ChairCEO 42%  49%  0%  0%  100% 
BoardSize 7.87  1.71  7.00  8.00  9.00 
ROA −0.47  0.72  −0.64  −0.35  −0.16 
FirmSize ($ millions) 918.63  3,975.24  41.23  89.62  247.40 
Leverage 0.14  0.29  0.00  0.01  0.13 
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Table 3  
Correlation table 
 
 *, **, and *** indicate significance at the p-level of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix D. 
 
Variable 
 
Discl-Index 
Tech-Discl-
Index 
 
Market-Discl-
Index 
 
Patents 
 
Preclinical 
 
Independent 
 
BussExp 
 
SuppSpec 
 
CommInfl 
ChairCE
O 
Board 
Size 
 
ROA 
Firm 
Size 
Leverag
e 
Discl-Index 1.00              
Tech-Discl-
Index 
0.67*** 1.00             
Market-Discl-
Index 
0.68*** 0.51*** 1.00            
Patents 0.25*** 0.16*** 0.15** 1.00           
Preclinical −0.38*** −0.19*** −0.21*** −0.46*** 1.00          
Independent −0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 −0.07 1.00         
BussExp −0.02 0.05 −0.03 0.00 −0.03 0.61*** 1.00        
SuppSpec 0.07 0.05 0.10* −0.02 0.04 0.19*** −0.29*** 1.00       
CommInfl −0.09 −0.09 −0.03 0.03 −0.09 0.26*** −0.20*** −0.40*** 1.00      
ChairCEO 0.19*** 0.12* 0.10* 0.07 −0.04 0.03 0.06 −0.01 −0.02 1.00     
BoardSize −0.01 0.00 0.04 0.08 −0.04 0.13** 0.09 −0.07 0.11* −0.09 1.00    
ROA −0.04 −0.08 −0.03 −0.01 0.05 0.02 0.00 −0.12** 0.160** −0.03 0.130** 1.00   
FirmSize −0.19*** −0.28*** −0.19*** 0.11* −0.15** 0.21*** 0.10* −0.14** 0.27*** −0.02 0.35*** 0.16** 1.00  
Leverage −0.08 −0.10 −0.07 0.02 −0.09 0.06 0.06 −0.01 0.00 −0.02 0.17*** −0.04 0.06 1.00 
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Table 4 
Association between disclosure index and the type of independent directors 
 
Discl-Index i,t= = β1 + β2 × Patentsi t + β3 × Preclinicali,t + β4 × Independenti,t  
  + β5 × Preclinicali,t × Independenti,t  + β6 × DirectorTypei,t  + β7 × Preclinicali,t × DirectorTypei,t  
 +Σβs × Controlsi,t   + εi,t.      
 
        Director type  
Variable       BussExp 
 
SuppSpec 
 
CommInfl 
 
 
Patents 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.130*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Preclinical −0.126*** −0.126*** −0.123*** −0.129*** −0.118*** −0.074** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.036) (0.028) (0.035) 
Ind  0.011 0.013 −0.032 0.046 0.049 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.057) (0.054) (0.053) 
Independent × Preclinical  −0.005 −0.005 0.091*** −0.097** 
   (0.010) (0.019) (0.034) (0.041) 
BussExp    0.076   
    (0.049)   
BussExp × Preclinical   0.001   
    (0.092)   
SuppSpec     0.004  
     (0.055)  
SuppSpec × Preclinical    −0.318***  
     (0.105)  
CommInfl      −0.018 
      (0.069) 
CommInfl × Preclinical     0.176** 
      (0.077) 
ChairCEO −0.027 −0.027 −0.027 −0.028* −0.025 −0.029* 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
BoardSize −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.004 −0.001 −0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
ROA −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
LogSize 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Leverage  −0.010 −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.013 −0.006 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Control for year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 410 410 410 410 410 410 
R-squared 39% 39% 39% 40% 42% 40% 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the p-level of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Standard errors are clustered on 
firms and are presented in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix D. 
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Table 5 
Association between technical disclosure index and the type of independent directors 
 
Tech-Discl-Index i,t= β1 + β2 × Patentsi t + β3 × Preclinicali,t  + β4 × BussExpi,t   β5 × Preclinicali,t × BussExp i,t  
  + β6 × SuppSpeci,t  + β7 × Preclinicali,t × SuppSpeci,t 
  + β8 × CommInfli,t  + β9 × Preclinicali,t × CommInfli,t 
  +Σβs × Controlsi,t   + εi,t .  
 
Panel A:  
     Director type is 
 Variable         BussExp 
 
SuppSpec 
 
CommInfl 
 Patents 0.027 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.025 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Preclinical −0.045** −0.045** −0.038** −0.034 −0.035* −0.009 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.022) 
Independent  −0.026 −0.021 −0.036 −0.010 0.001 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.035) (0.034) 
Independent × Preclinical   −0.013** −0.009 0.036 −0.067** 
   (0.006) (0.012) (0.022) (0.026) 
BussExp    0.029   
    (0.031)   
BussExp × Preclinical    −0.023   
    (0.059)   
SuppSpec     0.014  
     (0.035)  
SuppSpec × Preclinical     −0.161**  
     (0.068)  
CommInfl      −0.000 
      (0.044) 
CommInfl × Preclinical      0.104** 
      (0.049) 
ChairCEO −0.001 0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.001 −0.001 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
BoardSize 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ROA −0.008** −0.008** −0.008** −0.008** −0.008** −0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
LogSize 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Leverage  0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.011 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Control for year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 410 410 410 410 410 410 
R-squared 18.00% 18.10% 19.20% 19.50% 21.20% 20.05% 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the p-level of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Standard errors are clustered on 
firms and are presented in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix D. 
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Table 5 continued 
Association between market disclosure index and type of independent directors 
 
Market-Discl-Index i,t= β1 + β2 × Patentsi t + β3 × Preclinicali,t + β4 × BussExpi,t   
  + β5 × Preclinicali,t × BussExp i,t + β6 × SuppSpeci,t  + β7 × Preclinicali,t × SuppSpeci,t 
  + β8 × CommInfli,t  + β9 × Preclinicali,t × CommInfli,t 
  +Σβs × Controlsi,t   + εi,t .     
Panel B 
    Director type 
 Variable          BussExp 
 
SuppSpec 
 
CommInfl 
 Patents 0.030* 0.029* 0.030* 0.030* 0.030* 0.028* 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Preclinical −0.027* −0.027* −0.028* −0.038* −0.022 −0.009 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) 
Independent  0.012 0.011 0.011 0.004 0.024 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) 
Independent × Preclinical   0.002 −0.005 0.059*** −0.034 
   (0.005) (0.010) (0.018) (0.022) 
BussExp    −0.008   
    (0.026)   
BussExp × Preclinical    0.039   
    (0.050)   
SuppSpec     0.060**  
     (0.030)  
SuppSpec × Preclinical     −0.187***  
     (0.057)  
CommInfl      −0.026 
      (0.037) 
CommInfl × Preclinical      0.070* 
      (0.041) 
ChairCEO −0.016* −0.017* −0.017* −0.016* −0.016* −0.017* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
BoardSize −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.001 −0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
LogSize 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Leverage  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.006 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Control for year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 410 410 410 410 410 410 
R-squared 11.80% 11.90% 11.90% 12.10% 14.90% 12.70% 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the p-level of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Standard errors are clustered on 
firms and are presented in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix D. 
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